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Abstract
We present a new paradigm in the study of brain men-
tal dynamics on the basis of the stable transient activity
neural networks observed in experiments. This new ap-
proach is in contrast to traditional system analysis usu-
ally adopted in cognitive modeling. Transient dynamics
offers a sound formalism of the observed qualities of
brain activity, while providing a rigorous set of analysis
tools. Transients have two main features: First, they are
resistant to noise, and reliable even in the face of small
variations in initial conditions; the sequence of states
visited by the system (its trajectory), is thus structurally
stable. Second, the transients are input-specific, and
thus convey information about what caused them in the
first place. This new dynamical view manifests a rig-
orous explanation of how perception, cognition, emo-
tion, and other mental processes evolve as a sequence
of activity patterns in the brain, and, most importantly,
how they interfere with each other. The ideas discussed
and demonstrated here lead to the creation of a quan-
titative theory of the human mental activity and can be
deployed on artificial agents.
Introduction
It looks like the popular opinion that “it is much easier to
invent an artificial brain than to discover the working princi-
ples of the human brain” is true. This is because an artificial
intellect only requires the execution of mental functions, and
not the underlying brain mechanisms. This kind of model-
ing does not require the discovery of one of nature’s greatest
secrets, namely, the origin of thoughts.
A specific intellectual function cen be modeled in many
different ways, and none of these ways need to be bio-
mimetic. The success of artificial intelligence in discovering
these ways in its own path is important for understanding the
principles of the brain, because it provides us with a vision
of how a real-life problem can be solved in general, but not
necessarily of whether nature uses these principles.
It is crucial to realize that the transfer of “artificial ideas”
to the human brain may lead us in the wrong direction. Here
are two examples: The first one is a traditional paradigm
suggesting that the human brain is similar to a computer
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with a huge number of computing units. In contrast with
the computer, however, which reorganizes incoming infor-
mation, the brain is an active system that is also able to
generate new information by itself. The brain is even able to
generate its own emotions.
The second example is related to emotions: Due to the
profound interest in human-robot interactions, a new field
has emerged that involves the creation of emotional robots
(Fellous and Arbib 2005). Modeling the emotion-cognition
tandem of human mental life in robotic applications is a
very promising direction that could qualitatively leverage
the artificial intelligence. The state-of-the-art in emotional
robot design is faithful to the algorithmic perspective, pre-
scribes the solution in a sequential order. As a result the
artificial brain solves cognitive and emotional problems step
by step. However, both the cognition and the emotion are
complex dynamical processes that involve the representation
and the assessment of stimuli, stressors, and a prediction of
possible coping behaviors. To carry out these, the human
brain follows a parallel, competitive, and dynamical proce-
dure in continuous time. We claim that integration of these
priciples in the design is vital for the long-term success of
an emotionally- and cognitively-capable artificial agent, and
even for modeling disorders.
This paper accounts for these principles in an ecological
framework and formulates a joint dynamical model for cog-
nition and emotion. The model can be directly realized us-
ing basic numerical methods for real-time applications. In
the following section, we revisit the short history of the dy-
namical approaches to the modeling of the brain’s mental
functions of emotion, cognition, perception, and conscious-
ness. In Section III, we describe the model and a transient
dynamical regime within its repertoire that is critical in our
development. We provide some numerical examples in Sec-
tion IV, followed by a brief discussion and concluding re-
marks in Section V.
Dynamics of Cognition and Emotion
Background and Motivation
As the two main players of human mental life, emotion and
cognition have been under the spotlight for researchers for
a long time both individually and jointly. The tradition for
understanding thought based on dynamical systems theory
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has its roots in the cybernetics era of the 1940s. It was a
time when information theory, dynamics, and computation
were brought together for studying the brain (Ashby 1954).
However, with the dominance of symbolic artificial intel-
lect, “information-processing psychology,” and the absence
of a good experimental technology in the 1960s and 1970s,
dynamical-systems-based approaches were not extensively
pursued. More recently, the idea that dynamics is a relevant
framework for understanding cognition has become popu-
lar again. For example, (Thelen and Smith 1994) describe
the development of kicking and reaching in infants in terms
of dynamical notions such as the stability of attractors in
a phase space that is defined by the body and environmen-
tal parameters. Movements to new stages in development
are explained in terms of bifurcations to new attractors as
a result of a change in the order parameters, e.g., infant
weight, body length, etc., as the infant grows. Thelen and
Smith believe that “higher cognition” is ultimately rooted
in these types of spatial skills learned in infancy, and, thus,
that higher cognition will itself be best understood dynam-
ically. They contrast their account with traditional “infor-
mation processing” theories of development, in which new
developmental stages are caused by brain maturation and the
increasing ability of maturing infants to reason logically.
(Port and van Gelder 1995) have formulated the general
idea that cognition should be characterized as a continual
coupling among brain, body, and environment that unfolds
in real time, as opposed to the discrete time steps of the ar-
tificial intellect. This is said to contrast with the compu-
tation’s focus on “internal structure,” i.e., its concern with
the static organization of information processing and repre-
sentational structure in a cognitive system. A dynamical ap-
proach means that the organization of brain structures is also
dynamical and functional, i.e., not only anatomical. Thus
the dynamical approach to cognition is a confederation of
research efforts bound together by the idea that natural cog-
nition is a dynamical phenomenon and best understood in
dynamical terms. This contrasts with the “law of qualitative
structure” (Newell and Simon 1976) governing orthodox or
“classical” cognitive science, which holds that cognition is a
form of digital computation.
The quest for the dynamical origin of emotions goes back
many decades. (Franz 1935) devoted attention to the dy-
namics of emotions by describing emotional sequences to-
gether with their content. He emphasized that only the bal-
ance between incorporation, elimination and retention rep-
resents the fundamental dynamics of the biological process
called life. Recently, (Zautra 2003) has developed a two-
dimensional approach in which both positive and negative
emotions are conceptualized and measured as co-occurring
simultaneous dynamical processes.
The Natural Course of Mental Activity
Although classical cognitive science has interpreted cogni-
tion as something happening over time, the dynamical ap-
proach sees cognition as being in time, i.e., as an inherently
temporal phenomenon. For example, when a dynamical
model of the information (sensory) coding is created, time
is included in the coding space (Rabinovich et al. 2006).
Figure 1: Brain centers are densely connected networks
that can demonstrate a broad range of dynamical behaviors
within their individual phase spaces, as illustrated on the
left panel. Long-range (excitatory or inhibitory) connections
couple these dynamics (as shown on right panel) that results
in dynamical patterns observable on the joint phase space.
Details of timing (durations, rates, synchronizes, etc.) mat-
ter (Buzsaki and Draguhn 2004).
New results in the brain imaging, particularly functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data, have revealed
some fundamental properties and functional organization of
the brain systems that correlate with emotion and cognitive
functions (Phan et al. 2002; Dolcos and McCarthy 2006).
Each of the brain centers that form the functional emo-
tional subcircuit or mode is itself a very complex dynamical
system with several characteristic time scales (see Fig. 1).
These systems are open to an enormous range of neural stim-
ulations from a wide range of brain areas. The spatiotem-
poral pattern of brain activity underlying an emotion is typi-
cally very sensitive to the external or internal stimuli. Amyg-
dala, for example, receives information from both cortical
and subcortical structures. These include highly processed
information from the visual system, the auditory cortex, the
olfactory and gustatory neocortex and the somatosensory
cortex. In short, it is directly informed about each of the five
senses. The amygdala also receives projections from associ-
ation cortex, from the thalamus (relaying basic, unprocessed
sensory signals), the hippocampus (high level information
about the relationship between objects and events in the ex-
ternal world), and from a range of structures that represent
internal bodily states, such as hunger and thirst.
It is important to take into account that emotions and cog-
nition are active processes that result in specific changing
of the brain organization in time and dynamical brain’s re-
sponse to environmental information and representation of
the self. These processes are determined by the functional
(not necessary anatomical) connections between brain areas
or neural circuits that participate in the execution of cog-
nitive functions and generation of emotions. At different
segments or steps of temporal emotional or cognitive pro-
cess, these networks form different temporal sequences that
execute and represent different emotions and cognitive func-
tions in the brain.
Given the necessity that any useful analysis must be
based on an accurate quantification of the investigated phe-
nomenon, numerous attempts have been made to assess
cognition and emotion. Being directly related to the pro-
cessing of auxiliary information, cognition has attracted
relatively more attention in these efforts, particularly in
the form of task development assessing decision making
tasks(Schraagen and Chipman 2000; Hollnagel 2003). Al-
though, tests aiming solely at emotional quantities also ex-
ists (see, for example, (Price, Barreil, and Barrell 1985)),
the assessment of emotions or their effects have often been
attempted in a cognitive theme, involving, for example, ap-
praisal (Scherer 1993; Thagard and Aubie 2008), decision
making (Pessoa and Padmala 2005), or memory (Lee 1999;
Fales et al. 2008).
A dynamical system for the modeling of emotion, cogni-
tion and their interactions is a set of quantitative variables
changing continually, concurrently, and inter-dependently
over quantitative time in accordance with dynamical prin-
ciples, which are embodied in a set of differential equations.
Based on an accurate quantification method, dynamics of-
fers a very successful experience of dynamical modeling that
scientists use to understand natural phenomena via nonlin-
ear differential equations. This experience includes a set of
concepts, proofs, and tools for understanding the behavior
of systems in general. An important insight of dynamical
systems theory is that behavior can be understood geomet-
rically in some projection of the state (phase) space. The
behavior can then be described in terms of attractors, tran-
sients, stability, coupling, bifurcations, chaos, etc.
Metastability and Dynamical Principles
We base our modeling effort on the following principles:
• existence of metastable states representing the modes in
the unified emotion-cognition working space,
• structural stability of the transients that are formed by the
switching of the system (brain) among these states,
• ecological, i.e., competition principles governing these
switchings.
The first item, i.e., metastability, is a general nonlinear
dynamics concept, which describes states of delicate equi-
librium. Metastability in brain is a phenomenon, which is
being studied in neuroscience to elucidate how the human
mind process information and recognizes patterns. There
are semi-transient signals in the brain, which persist for
a while and are different than the usual equilibrium state
(Abeles et al. 1995). Metastability is a principle that
describes the brain’s ability to make sense out of seem-
ingly random environmental cues (Oullier and Kelso 2006;
Werner 2007). The metastable activity of the cortex can also
be inferred from the behavior (Bressler and Kelso 2001).
The metastability is supported by the flexibility of coupling
among diverse brain centers or neuron groups (Friston 1997;
Friston 2000; Ito, Nikolaev, and van Leeuwen 2007; Sasaki,
Matsuki, and Ikegaya 2007; Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts
2006). The temporal order of the metastable states is de-
termined by the functional connectivity of the underlying
networks and their causality structure (Chen, Bressler, and
Ding 2009). The mathematical image of a metastable state
is a saddle in the state space of the system. The image of the
transition between these saddles is the unstable separatrix
connecting them (see Fig. 2). Such construction is named a
heteroclinic chain.
Figure 2: A heteroclinic channel is a sequence of metastable
states (i.e., saddles) organized in such a way that the unsta-
ble manifold of one saddle is owned as the stable manifold of
the following saddle (left panel). The channel can be (struc-
turally) stable (i.e., attractive for any point in its vicinity);
this is a common situation arising in a number of normal
forms for a broad range of parameters.
Winnerless Competition as a Dynamical
Mechanism of Transients Stability
Competition without a winner (or, continuously changing
winners), is a widely-known phenomenon in systems in-
volving more than two interacting agents that satisfy a
relationship similar to the voting paradox (Borda 1781;
Saari 1995) or the popular game rock-paper-scissors. The
mathematical image of it is a heteroclinic cycle, which was
first formulated in (Busse and Heikes 1980) in modeling
convection in a rotating layer. As a generic dynamical
phenomenon, which is rare in simple systems yet common
in complex ones, the sequential switching among saddles
can provide concise and constructive formulations in a va-
riety of real-world problems (Afraimovich et al. 2008).
Prototype dynamical models that are widely accepted in
computational neuroscience (Wilson and Cowan 1973), and
ecology (Lotka 1925) have been shown to exhibit a tran-
sitive winnerless competition for a fairly broad range of
parameters (Rabinovich, Huerta, and Afraimovich 2006;
Huerta and Rabinovich 2004; Afraimovich et al. 2008).
Since the time spent within a saddle vicinity is inversely
proportional with the (logarithm of the) noise level (vari-
ance) (Kifer 1981; Stone and Holmes 1990), the character-
istic time of such a transient varies in a wide range. In a
stable heteroclinic sequence, the order of temporal winners
is fixed and the noise is able to accelerate the process. Thus,
the noise must be large enough to maintain the switching
behavior at the desired rate (on average) and small enough
to keep the heteroclinic nature of system on track, i.e. to
maintain stability.
Embedding a structurally stable heteroclinic skeleton in
the phase space (see Fig. 2) results in a channel which
routes the volume around it along the imposed sequence.
Within this volume, the system behavior is reproducible
with finite accuracy. Since the location of the saddles con-
veys input-specific information, which is activated the corre-
sponding metastable states and their sequential order by the
strength and the topology of the connections, then the sys-
tem becomes both noise-rejecting and input-sensitive (due
to following the stimulus-specific channel) simultaneously.
The key mechanism underlying the winnerless competi-
tion in brain is inhibition, which is known to exist in neu-
ral systems at micro- and macroscopic levels (Aron 2007;
Kelly et al. 2008; Jaffard et al. 2008; Buzsaki, Kaila, and
Raichle 2007).
There is substantial experimental support (Abeles et al.
1995; Jones et al. 2007; Rabinovich, Huerta, and Laurent
2008) that metastability and transient dynamics are the key
phenomena underlying cortical processes and thus yield a
better understanding of a dynamical brain.
The Model
The Lotka-Volterra System
As numerous results show, the Generalized Lotka-Volterra
(GLV) model given by
τ
d
dt
xi(t) = xi
[
µi(E)−
n∑
i=1
ϕij(E)xi(t)
]
+ xi(t) · η(t),
i = 1, . . . , n. (1)
is playing the role of a normal form for the dynamical
analysis of competition among n agents (see, for example,
(Afraimovich et al. 2008)). Here xi ≥ 0 is the i-th compet-
ing agent, E is the input that captures all (known) external
effects on the competition, τ is the time-constant, µi’s are
the increments that represent the resources available to the
competitor i to prosper, ϕij is the competition matrix, and
η(t) is a multiplicative noise perturbing the system.
The basic GLV form, as introduced above, lacks a cou-
pling term to account for the interaction between the two
processes. A rigorous complement to GLV in our case re-
quires more insight into how the individual dynamics of cog-
nitive and emotional modes interact. Ecological models of
competing modes are directly applicable in describing and
prediction of temporal structure of emotional and cognitive
functions, such as sequential learning, short-term memory,
and decision making in a changing environment.
The GLV equations can demonstrate a variety of dynami-
cal behaviors. Among them we are particularly interested in
the heteroclinic behavior, which arises when the parameters
µ and ϕij are kept within certain ranges as formulated by in
(Afraimovich, Zhigulin, and Rabinovich 2004).
Ecological Model of Mental Dynamics
We formulate the ecological model of the mental dynamics
by three sets of variables. The first two are regarding the
cognitive functions and the emotions, respectively:
τA · d
dt
Ai(t) = Ai(t) [σi(I,B) ·RA−
N∑
j=1
ρijAj(t)
+Ai(t) · η(t),
i = 1, . . . , N, (2)
τB · d
dt
Bi(t) = Bi(t) [ζi(S,A) ·RB−
M∑
j=1
ξijBj(t)
+Bi(t) · η(t),
i = 1, . . . ,M. (3)
The nonnegative variables Ai and Bi, as described above,
correspond to the cognitive and emotional modes, the union
of which are denoted by A and B respectively. The pro-
posed model is merely a formulation of the competition
within and among these two sets of modes. Both of these
modes are open to the external world through the quantities
I and S, denoting the cognitive load and the stressor, re-
spectively. The functions σi(·) and ζi(·) are positive incre-
ments promoting the cognitive and the emotional processes,
respectively. These terms’ dependence on the cognitive and
emotional modes enable the direct interaction between the
two processes, which, depending on the exact form of these
functions, can excite or inhibit each other. These two cou-
pled processes evolve on time scales determined by the pa-
rameters τA and τB . Both processes are open to the brain
noise, which appears as the multiplicative perturbation η(t)
in the equations.
The competition driving the mental processes in the joint
emotion-cognition workspace is for the finite resources
needed to carry out each process. Two basic types of re-
sources are the energy (oxygen, glucose, etc.) and the infor-
mation (attention and memory), both assumed to be supplied
to the whole body of modes in constant amounts.
Working memory (WM) is a buffer for information over
a short period of time. Experimental findings suggest
that brain networks that are supported WM dynamics are
strongly overlapping with networks that support attention
dynamics. This overlap in function exists not only on an
anatomical but also on a functional/dynamical level. There-
fore we propose a model of attention-working memory in-
formational recourses. Attention chooses from available
information the items that are currently relevant to cogni-
tion including emotion, appraisal, and the coping strategy.
Experiments suggest that any enhancing effect of attention
can be explained by competitive interaction among attention
modes that represent all of the considerable informational
items.
It is important to note that the latter resource is a product
of the brain itself, and that, its availability may have differ-
ent effects on each cognitive and emotional processes that
evolve in parallel. The share that each process gets from the
available resources is represented in the model by the two
positive variables RA and RB , which also compete among
themselves separately, partitioning the unity:
d
dt
RA(t) = RA(t)
[
N∑
i=1
Ai − (RA(t)+
φA(I)RB(t))] , (4)
d
dt
RB(t) = RB(t)
[
M∑
i=1
Bi − (RB(t)+
φB(S)RA(t))] . (5)
Two fixed parameters φA and φB determine this competition
among two resources.
The model embodies competition in three different ways:
(i) within the modes that make up the cognitive function or
the emotion,
Figure 3: Simulation of the stressor-induced emotion-
cognition interaction generated by the proposed ecological
model. The bottom curve is the temporal profile of the stres-
sor, which triggers the emotional activity depicted on the
second row. Arousal of these emotional modes affect the on-
going cognitive activity negatively, as seen on the first row.
This effect is due to two couplings between the cognitive
and emotional processes: (i) the direct interaction encoded
in the cognitive increments σ (see text), and (ii) through the
resource competition, whose trace is shown on the third row.
(ii) among the modes of the two processes,
(iii) via the resources available to each process.
Simulations
Here we give two examples of mental dynamics that illus-
trate the emergence of negative emotions and their interac-
tion with cognitive processing.
In the first example, an auxiliary stressor S triggers these
emotions, which in turn disrupts an ongoing cognitive se-
quence. Thus, the simulation demonstrates the feed-forward
chain of events
S ⇒ negative emotions⇒ cognitive disruption
Let us consider N = 5 cognitive modes and M = 5 emo-
tional components. The multiplicative perturbation η(t) is
a white noise with variance 10−8 and 10−3 for the cogni-
tive and the emotional dynamics, respectively, and the time
constants are τA = τB = 20.
Without loss of generality, we prescribed the finite hete-
roclinic sequence of saddles e1 → 2 → · · · → e5 for the
emotional modes. The mode e5 is a stable attractor (i.e.,
without any unstable manifold so that the system is confined
to the vicinity of e5 once it enters its domain of attraction).
This state marks the terminal cognitive mode, such as the ex-
ecution of a certain coping strategy, whereas the preceding
modes denote the cognitive tasks that lead to this resulting
activity. They could be named, for instance, as perception,
appraisal, evaluation, and selection, in their order of appear-
ance in the sequence.
The feasible values of ρij that can establish the desired
heteroclinic skeleton in the A network constitute a broad
Figure 4: The emotional activity and the stressor level caus-
ing it have a hysteresis relation. The stressor magnitude that
results in a given level of emotional activity is not unique
and depends on whether the stressor is being modified in an
increasing or decreasing direction. It can be shown that the
mechanism responsible from this contrast is the indirect (re-
sources) competition.
continuum in the parameter space. A set of sufficient condi-
tions that determine a part of this region in the form of sim-
ple inequalities on σi and ρij can be found in (Afraimovich,
Zhigulin, and Rabinovich 2004). Following these condi-
tions, we set ρii = 1.0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, ρi−1,i = 1.5
for i ∈ {2, . . . , 5}, ρi,i+1 = 0.5 for i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, and
ρij = ρj−1,j + 2 for j ∈ {2, 3, 4} and i /∈ j − 1, j, j + 1.
In this illustration, the five emotional modes were orga-
nized as a heteroclinic sequence, yet as a cyclic one by in-
troducing e5 → e1 transition. We note that we do not neces-
sarily name the emotional components individually, but in-
terpret their mean activity as the degree of anxiety, a negative
emotional state. In this respect, the precise dynamical qual-
ity of the emotional network is not of primary consideration
in our design; for the sake of our illustrations, the emotional
behavior could have been realized simply as a limit cycle, or
as a strange attractor. The ξij was evaluated as done above
for ρij , yet taking into account the e5 → e1 transition, which
results in ξ5,5 = 0.5.
All five increments σi in the cognitive process were mod-
elled as 1 −∑i=1Bi(t), i.e., inversely proportional to the
total (negative) emotional activity. The increments ζi for the
five emotional modes were considered as independent of the
cognitive activity in this example; they were all equal to the
externally applied stressor quantity S, which was assumed
to be non-negative.
The resource competition RA vs. RB is regulated by the
equations (4) and (5) with parameters φA = φB = 0.3 and
random initial conditions.
With the selected parameters, the integration of the ordi-
nary differential equations were performed by the Milstein
approximation. The results shown in Fig. 3 were obtained.
The figure illustrates the suppression of and delay in the cog-
nition due to the emotional activity, which is induced by an
external stressor.
Figure 5: A self-induced emotion-cognition interaction as
generated by the proposed ecological model. The interpre-
tations are as in the previous figure. Here a certain cogni-
tive mode, the A4 denoted by the green curve, triggers the
emotional activity, which suppresses the cognitive activity
in return. The emotional activity is time-limited as encoded
in ξ (see text); the cognitive process returns to back its track
after this period.
An interesting prediction that can be derived from the
model is the contrast in the switching regimes of the total ac-
tivity in the cognitive and the emotional network during the
rising and decay periods of S. This can be better observed
in Fig. 4 which shown
∑5
i=1Ai versus
∑5
i=1Bi with the
underlying S color-coded.
The second example studies the self-induction of nega-
tive emotions by a certain cognitive mode, such as appraisal
or self-evaluation. In this case, we study the autonomous
regime:
negative emotions⇀↽ cognitive disruption.
The individual dynamical qualities (i.e., the mode orders
and the heteroclinic skeletons) were the same as in the first
example. All parameters and couplings were also retained,
with the exception of the design of ξ. The increments for the
emotional modes were assigned as A4, the fourth cognitive
mode and were all reset to zero after 200 time units. Note
that the triggering effect is internal, due to a specific cogni-
tive mode. Figure 5 shows a result of this simulation. The
phase portrait representing the dynamics of the total cogni-
tive activity and the emotional modes is shown in Fig. 6.
Conclusion
We have presented here a unified theory of emotion and cog-
nition that for the first time considered their the dynamics of
their mutual interactions in time. This theory accommodates
various components such as emotional-cognitive appraisal,
generation of coping strategies, and informational resources
such as attention and working memory. The theory is rooted
in general dynamical principals: competition for brain re-
sources including energetic and informational; robustness,
reproducibility and transitivity.
Figure 6: The change in the cognitive activity
∑5
i=1A5 with
respect to the emotional activity which is separated into two
axes. The color change from dark to light shows time arrow.
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